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Abstract—This paper proposes a new design of non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) under secrecy considerations. We focus
on a NOMA system where a transmitter sends confidential
messages to multiple users in the presence of an external
eavesdropper. The optimal designs of decoding order, transmis-
sion rates, and power allocated to each user are investigated.
Considering the practical passive eavesdropping scenario where
the instantaneous channel state of the eavesdropper is unknown,
we adopt the secrecy outage probability as the secrecy metric.
We first consider the problem of minimizing the transmit power
subject to the secrecy outage and quality of service constraints,
and derive the closed-form solution to this problem. We then
explore the problem of maximizing the minimum confidential
information rate among users subject to the secrecy outage and
transmit power constraints, and provide an iterative algorithm to
solve this problem. We find that the secrecy outage constraint in
the studied problems does not change the optimal decoding order
for NOMA, and one should increase the power allocated to the
user whose channel is relatively bad when the secrecy constraint
becomes more stringent. Finally, we show the advantage of
NOMA over orthogonal multiple access in the studied problems
both analytically and numerically.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, non-orthogonal multiple
access, secrecy outage probability, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is envisaged as
a potentially promising technique to address some key chal-
lenges in the fifth generation (5G) networks, such as high
spectral efficiency and massive connectivity [1], [2]. Different
from the traditional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) tech-
niques that rely on the orthogonal resource allocation, such as
time-division multiple access (TDMA), the NOMA explores
the non-orthogonal resource allocation. Two dominant NOMA
solutions for future networks have been proposed, which
are the power domain multiplexing and the code domain
multiplexing [2]. For the power domain multiplexing, different
users are allocated with different power levels according
to their channel conditions, and the successive interference
cancellation (SIC) is used to cancel multi-user interference.
For the code domain multiplexing, e.g., sparse code multiple
access, different users are assigned with different codes, and
then multiplexed over the same time-frequency resources.
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The performance of NOMA in the network with randomly
deployed users was analyzed in [3]. The design problem of
the NOMA scheme from a fairness standpoint was addressed
in [4]. Cooperative NOMA schemes were investigated in
[5] and [6] to improve the system reliability. To provide
additional spatial degrees of freedom, multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) techniques were introduced to NOMA systems
in [7] and [8]. The hybrid multiple access system combining
NOMA and traditional OMA by the technique of user pairing
was studied in [9].
As ubiquitous wireless devices are adopted in modern life,
an unprecedented amount of private and sensitive data is
transmitted over wireless channels. Consequently, the secrecy
issues associated with wireless networks have become crit-
ical. On the other hand, the information exchange between
transceivers over wireless channels is vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ping, due to the unalterable open nature of wireless medium.
Therefore, the research on the secrecy issue of wireless trans-
missions is of significant importance. Physical layer security
has been widely regarded as a promising complement to the
cryptographic techniques to secure the data transmission over
wireless channels [10], [11]. In the seminal work [12], Wyner
introduced the wiretap channel as a framework for physical
layer security, where a transmitter wants to send confidential
messages to a legitimate receiver in the presence of an external
eavesdropper. Following Wyner’s wiretap channel, the wireless
physical layer security against external eavesdroppers has been
extensively studied in recent years, e.g., [13]–[15] from an
information-theoretic perspective on the performance analysis
and [16]–[18] from a signal-processing perspective on the
system design. It is worth mentioning that there is another
research direction on physical layer security, which does not
focus on the secrecy issue against external eavesdroppers. In-
stead, confidential messages to the intended users are required
to remain ignorance at other users, e.g., [19]–[23].
Although a great amount of research effort has been paid
to physical layer security in wireless communications, the
secrecy issue of NOMA has been rarely considered in the
literature, except for the recent studies [24]–[26]. On the
other hand, in future wireless networks, it is indeed pivotal to
explore the security level of the non-orthogonal transmission
among multiple users. The secrecy issues of NOMA against
external eavesdroppers were studied in [24] and [25], where
the messages sent to all users by NOMA are required to be
secure against the external eavesdropper. Considering large-
scale networks, the secrecy performance of NOMA with ran-
domly deployed users and eavesdroppers were analyzed in [24]
by using stochastic geometry [27]. Focusing on the design of
2NOMA scheme, the problem of maximizing the secrecy sum
rate at all users subject to a qualify of service (QoS) constraint
of the codeword rate at each user was tackled in [25]. Note
that the perfect secrecy rate/capacity considered in [25] can be
ensured only when the transmitter has the perfect knowledge
on the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI), which
is difficult to realize in practice. In addition, the QoS constraint
of the codeword rate cannot guarantee the rate of informative
data received by the user, although it simplifies the design
problem. Instead of considering the external eavesdropper, [26]
investigated the NOMA system where the transmitter wants
to send the confidential message to only one user and keep it
ignorance at all other users.
From the above discussion, we note that the design problem
of NOMA schemes against the external eavesdropper with
appropriate secrecy and QoS performance metrics has yet been
investigated. This motivates us to design the secure NOMA
schemes for the practical scenario where the transmitter does
not know the eavesdropper’s instantaneous channel informa-
tion. In this scenario, the perfect secrecy rate is usually not
achievable, and hence, we do not take it as the secrecy metric.
Instead, we use the secrecy outage probability to measure the
secrecy performance of the system [28]. We highlight that the
secrecy outage probability is an appropriate secrecy metric
for the systems where the eavesdropper’s CSI is not perfectly
known [15], [18], [29]. The primary contributions of the paper
are summarized as follows.
• We comprehensively investigate the design of NOMA
against the external eavesdropper under the secrecy out-
age constraint. The decoding order, transmission rates,
and power allocated to each user are all considered as
designable parameters. For the first time, we analytically
prove that the optimal decoding order for the NOMA
scheme with the secrecy outage constraint is the same
as that for the conventional NOMA scheme without the
secrecy constraint, i.e., the descending order of channel
gains normalized by noise [30].
• We derive the closed-form solution to the problem of min-
imizing the transmit power subject to the secrecy outage
constraint and a QoS constraint. Different from [25], the
QoS performance is characterized by the confidential in-
formation rate at each user, which appropriately captures
the real rate of informative data received at the user. The
problem is non-convex. Unlike many conventional design
problems of NOMA, e.g., [4], [25], [31], our problem
cannot be transformed into a sequence of liner programs
(LPs) due to the secrecy outage constraint, and hence, it
is more difficult to solve.
• We further solve the problem of maximizing the mini-
mum confidential information rate among users subject
to the secrecy outage constraint and an instantaneous
transmit power constraint. Here, we regard the minimum
confidential information rate among users as a fairness
performance of NOMA with the secrecy consideration,
which has never been investigated in the literature. We
propose an iterative algorithm to solve the problem,
and obtain the closed-form solution to the problem for
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a NOMA system in the presence of an external
eavesdropper.
the special case of two users. We find that one should
increase the ratio of power allocated to the user who
has a relatively bad channel when the secrecy constraint
becomes more stringent.
• Both analytically and numerically, we compare the per-
formance of the NOMA scheme with that of the OMA
scheme in the studied problems with the secrecy outage
constraint. We analytically prove that the NOMA scheme
always outperforms the OMA scheme, and numerically
show that the performance gain of the NOMA scheme
over the OMA scheme increases almost linearly as the
number of users increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the system model. Sections III and IV study
the problem of minimizing the transmit power subject to
the secrecy outage and QoS constraints and the problem
of maximizing the minimum confidential information rate
subject to the secrecy outage and transmit power constraints,
respectively. The analytical comparison between NOMA and
OMA in the studied problems is conducted in Section V.
The numerical results are presented in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a communication system
where a transmitter wants to send confidential messages to K
users in the presence of an eavesdropper. We assume that the
eavesdropper is external, and the transmitter can distinguish
the eavesdropper from its own users. In practice, the transmit-
ter can identify its users through the authentication process
before the data transmission. The transmitter, the users, and
the eavesdropper each have a single antenna. For the sake of
brevity, we denote the k-th user as user k, k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}.
The channel coefficients from the transmitter to user k and the
eavesdropper are denoted by hk and he, respectively. Both path
loss and fading effects are considered, such that hk = d
−α/2
k gk
and he = d
−α/2
e ge, where α denotes the path-loss exponent,
dk and de denote the distances from the transmitter to user k
and the eavesdropper, respectively, and gk, ge ∼ CN (0, 1)
denote the normalized Rayleigh fading channel states. The
quasi-static block fading model is adopted [32], such that the
channel coefficients remain constant during the transmission
of one message, which consists of a block of symbols, and
3change independently from one block to the next. We assume
that all channels are independent of each other. Without loss
of generality, the channel gains are sorted as 0 < |h1|2 ≤
· · · ≤ |hK |2. We further assume that the transmitter knows
the instantaneous channel gains of all users, i.e., |hk|2, but
knows only the average channel gain of the eavesdropper
over different fading realizations, i.e, E
{
|hk|2
}
, where E{·}
denotes the expectation operation. Note that E
{
|hk|2
}
= d−αe
can be obtained at the transmitter from the knowledge of
the distance between the transmitter and the eavesdropper.
Here, we emphasize that the transmitter does not have the
instantaneous knowledge on the eavesdropper’s channel. It is
worth mentioning that even the statistics of the eavesdropper’s
channel may not be easy to obtain. Ideally, the physical layer
security can be achieved without knowing any CSI of the
eavesdropper. Unfortunately, this is not achievable by the
physical layer security techniques in most wireless networks.
Therefore, we have used the widely-adopted assumption of
knowing the statistics of the eavesdropper’s channel; see,
e.g., [10], [15], [29] and references within. In practice, the
channel statistics of the eavesdropper can be estimated per the
knowledge of the fading environment and the distance of the
eavesdropper. For example, the Rayleigh fading model is often
assumed for the rich-scattering environment with no line-of-
sight propagation between the transceivers, and the average
channel gain can be estimated based on the distance between
the transceivers.
A. NOMA Scheme
The NOMA scheme enables the transmitter to simultane-
ously serve multiple users [1], [3]. The transmitter uses the
superposition coding (SC) to send a linear combination of
multiple signals to the users. The transmitted signal is given by∑K
k=1
√
Pksk, where Pk denotes the transmit power allocated
to user k and sk denotes the normalized message for user
k. The instantaneous total transmit power is
∑K
k=1 Pk . The
received signal at user k and the eavesdropper are, respectively,
given by
yk = hk
K∑
k=1
√
Pksk + nk (1)
and
ye = he
K∑
k=1
√
Pksk + ne, (2)
where nk and ne denote the zero-mean additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN) at user k with variance σ2k and the
zero-mean AWGN at the eavesdropper with variance σ2e ,
respectively. We assume that the noise variances at all users
are identical, i.e., σ21 = · · · = σ2k=σ2u.
As per the mechanism of NOMA, all users adopt the SIC
to decode messages with the same decoding order [30]. Note
that for NOMA systems with the secrecy consideration, it is
not clear what the optimal decoding order is. Thus, the m-th
message to be decoded at users may not be the message for
userm. As such, we need to introduce the variable π to denote
the decoding order and optimize the decoding order π as well.
For example, if π(1) = 3, then the first message to be decoded
for the SIC is the message for user 3. Specifically, user π(k)
decodes the messages for all users π(j), ∀ j < k, before
decoding its own message to remove the inter-user interference
in a successive way. Then, user π(k) decodes its own message
while treating the messages for all users π(i), ∀ i > k, as
the interference. The received signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratios (SINRs) at user π(k), k < K , and user π(K) to decode
their own messages are given by
SINRπ(k) =
∣∣hπ(k)∣∣2 Pπ(k)∣∣hπ(k)∣∣2∑Ki=k+1 Pπ(i) + σ2u
=
γπ(k)Pπ(k)
1 + γπ(k)
∑K
i=k+1 Pπ(i)
, k < K (3)
and
SINRπ(K) =
∣∣hπ(K)∣∣2 Pπ(K)
σ2u
= γπ(K)Pπ(K), (4)
respectively, where γπ(k) =
∣∣hπ(k)∣∣2 /σ2u. In addition, the
received SINR at user π(m) to decode the message sπ(k),
k < m ≤ K , is given by
SINRπ(m),π(k) =
∣∣hπ(m)∣∣2 Pπ(k)∣∣hπ(m)∣∣2∑Ki=k+1 Pπ(i) + σ2u
=
γπ(m)Pπ(k)
1 + γπ(m)
∑K
i=k+1 Pπ(i)
, k < m ≤ K.
(5)
Similarly, the received SINRs at the eavesdropper of the
message sk, k < K , and the message sK are given by [25]
SINRπ˜(k) =
|he|2 Pπ(k)
|he|2
∑K
i=k+1 Pπ(i) + σ
2
e
=
γePπ(k)
1 + γe
∑K
i=k+1 Pπ(i)
, k < K (6)
and
SINRπ˜(K) =
|he|2 Pπ(K)
σ2e
= γePπ(K), (7)
respectively, where γe = |he|2 /σ2e . Note that the expressions
for the received SINRs at eavesdropper here overestimate
the eavesdropper’s capability. A worst-case assumption from
the legitimate users’ perspective is made here. That is, the
eavesdropper has already decoded the messages for all users
π(j), ∀ j < k, before it attempts to decode the message for
user π(k). This assumption also implies that the eavesdropper
knows the decoding order and the power allocation. In fact,
the eavesdropper may or may not know the users’ decoding
order and the power allocation, and may or may not know
the messages for all users π(j), ∀ j < k, before it attempts
to decode the message for user π(k). However, the legitimate
users cannot know the eavesdropper’s knowledge, since the
eavesdropper would not inform the legitimate users about its
ability and the instantaneous CSI. Thus, we have to adopt the
worst-case assumption from the legitimate users’ perspective
due to the conservativeness mandated by the security studies.
Note that this assumption has been adopted in the previous
4work on the secrecy of NOMA systems [25]. In addition,
we highlight that worst-case assumptions have been widely
adopted in analyzing and designing transmission schemes with
secrecy considerations; see, e.g., [23], [33], [34].
It has been clearly shown that the capacity-achieving decod-
ing order for conventional NOMA schemes is in the descend-
ing order of channel gains normalized by noise, i.e., channel
strengths [30], [35]. However, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, the optimal decoding order for NOMA schemes
with the secrecy consideration has never been analyzed or
discussed in the existing literature.
It is worth mentioning that the considered NOMA scheme
in this paper is the power domain NOMA, and the proposed
secrecy scheme is applicable to systems with power domain
NOMA. The proposed scheme is not applicable to the code
domain NOMA, e.g., sparse code multiple access, where
different users are assigned with different codes multiplexed
over the same time-frequency resources [2].
B. Secure Encoding
We consider the widely-adopted wiretap code [12] to secure
the transmission of messages. There are two rate parameters
for the message to each user k, namely, the codeword trans-
mission rate, Rt,k, and the confidential information rate, Rs,k.
The positive rate difference Rt,k − Rs,k is the rate cost to
provide secrecy against the eavesdropper. A length n wiretap
code is constructed by generating 2nRt,k codewords xn(w, v),
where w = 1, · · · , 2nRs,k and v = 1, · · · , 2n(Rt,k−Rs,k).
For each message index w, we randomly select v from{
1, 2, · · · , 2n(Rt,k−Rs,k)} with uniform probability and trans-
mit the codeword xn(w, v). We consider the adaptive-rate
transmission, where the rate parameters Rt,k and Rs,k can
be adaptively chosen according to the instantaneous CSI of
the users.
Since the quasi-static fading channel is considered and the
eavesdropper’s instantaneous CSI is unknown at the transmit-
ter, perfect secrecy is not achievable. The secrecy outage prob-
ability is adopted to measure the secrecy performance of the
transmission [15], [28], [29]. The secrecy outage probability
of the message sπ(k) is given by [28]
pso,π(k) = P
(
Rt,π(k) −Rs,π(k) < Ce,π(k)
)
, (8)
where P(·) denotes the probability measure and Ce,π(k) =
log2
(
1 + SNRπ˜(k)
)
denotes the eavesdropper’s channel ca-
pacity to decode the message sπ(k).
III. TRANSMIT POWER MINIMIZATION
In this section, we design the NOMA scheme that minimizes
the total transmit power subject to the QoS constraint and
the secrecy constraint. The QoS performance of the NOMA
transmission with wiretap encoding is characterized by the
confidential information rate for each user k, i.e., Rs,k. It
is worth mentioning that in [25] the QoS performance is
captured by the codeword transmission rate for each user k,
i.e., Rt,k, which is different from our work. We highlight
that the adopted confidential information rate in this work is
more suitable than the codeword transmission rate to capture
the QoS performance for the transmission with the wiretap
code. This is because that the actual rate of the informative
data is the confidential information rate, while the codeword
transmission rate is the total rate of the informative data
and the redundancy to provide secrecy. For example, a user
who is served by a high codeword transmission rate with a
low confidential information rate actually obtains the useful
information slowly, which cannot be considered as a good
quality of service.
A. Problem Formulation
The problem is formulated as follows:
min
pi,P ,Rt,Rs
K∑
k=1
Pπ(k), (9a)
s.t. 0 < Pπ(k), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (9b)
Rs,π(k) ≤ Rt,π(k), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (9c)
Rt,π(k) ≤ Cπ(k), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (9d)
Rt,π(k) ≤ Cπ(m),π(k), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K − 1} ,
∀m ∈ {k + 1, · · · ,K} , (9e)
Q ≤ Rs,π(k), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (9f)
pso,π(k) ≤ ǫ, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} . (9g)
where pi = [π(1), · · · , π(K)] denotes the decoding
order vector, P =
[
Pπ(k), · · · , Pπ(K)
]
denotes the
power allocation vector, Rt =
[
Rt,π(1), · · · , Rt,π(K)
]
denotes the codeword transmission rate vector, Rs =[
Rs,π(1), · · · , Rs,π(K)
]
denotes the confidential information
rate vector, Cπ(k) = log2
(
1 + SINRπ(k)
)
denotes the channel
capacity of user π(k) to decode its own message, Cπ(m),π(k) =
log2
(
1 + SINRπ(m),π(k)
)
denotes the channel capacity of user
π(m) to decode the message sπ(k), Q denotes the minimum
acceptable confidential information rate for each user, and
0 < ǫ < 1 denotes the maximum tolerable secrecy outage
probability for each message. In the formulated problem (9),
the constraint (9d) is to ensure that sπ(k) can be decoded
by user π(k) without error, and the constraint (9e) is to
ensure that sπ(k) can be decoded by user π(m), m > k,
for the SIC. In addition, the QoS constraint is represented
by (9f), which requires a minimum acceptable confidential
information rate Q > 0 for each user. The secrecy constraint
is represented by (9g), which requires a maximum tolerable
secrecy outage probability ǫ for each message. We assume
that all users have the same QoS requirement Q and the same
secrecy outage requirement ǫ. It is worth mentioning that our
analysis can be extended to the general scenario where each
user have a different QoS requirement Qk and a different
secrecy outage requirement ǫk, which however is beyond the
scope of this work. Note that the problem (9) is not always
feasible depending on the channel conditions of the users and
the eavesdropper. In this section, we assume that the problem
(9) is feasible. The condition for the problem (9) to be feasible
will be given later in Corollary 1.
B. Problem Simplification
One can find that the optimal Rt,π(k) is the maximum
Rt,π(k) that satisfies (9d) and (9e). Then, based on (3) and (5),
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order pi and power allocation P is given by
Rot,π(k)=
{
log2
(
1+
γt,pi(k)Ppi(k)
1+γt,pi(k)
∑
K
i=k+1 Ppi(i)
)
, if k ≤ K−1
log2
(
1+γπ(K)Pπ(K)
)
, if k = K,
(10)
where γt,π(k) = mini∈{k,··· ,K} γπ(i). One can also find that
the optimal Rs,π(k) is the minimum Rs,π(k) that satisfies (9f),
since the minimum power consumption is a non-decreasing
function of the confidential information rate. Then, the optimal
solution of Rs to the problem (9) is given by
Ros,π(k) = Q, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} . (11)
With (10) and (11), the secrecy outage probability is derived
as (12), shown at the top of the next page, where γ¯e =
E {γe} = d−αe /σ2e .
Based on (12), we have the following proposition to sum-
marize the optimal decoding order to the problem (9).
Proposition 1: When the problem (9) is feasible, the opti-
mal decoding order pi to the problem (9) satisfies
γπ(1) ≤ γπ(2) · · · ≤ γπ(K), (13)
and hence, the optimal decoding order is given by pio =
[πo(1), · · · , πo(K)], where
πo(k) = k, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} . (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
From Proposition 1, we note that the optimal decoding order
for the studied NOMA scheme with the secrecy outage con-
straint is the same as that for the conventional NOMA scheme
without the secrecy consideration, which is in the descending
order of channel gains normalized by noise.
With (10), (11), (14), and the fact that (9c) always could be
satisfied if (9g) can be satisfied, the problem (9) is simplified
and rewritten as:
min
P
K∑
k=1
Pk, (15a)
s.t. 0 < Pk, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} (15b)
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤
1+γk
∑K
i=k Pi
1+γk
∑
K
i=k+1 Pi
− 2Q
2Q
∑K
i=k Pi− 1+γk
∑
K
i=k Pi
1+γk
∑
K
i=k+1 Pi
∑K
i=k+1 Pi
,
∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K − 1} , (15c)
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤ 1 + γKPK − 2Q
2QPK
. (15d)
Note that the problem (15) is non-convex due to the non-
convex constraint in (15c). The design parameters P1, · · · , PK
are coupled with each other in a complicated way. Thus,
the problem cannot be directly solved by a standard convex
optimization solver [36]. Furthermore, we note that the design
problems in the existing studies of NOMA schemes can often
be transformed into a sequence of liner programs (LPs); see,
e.g., [4], [25], [31]. In contrast, our problem cannot be
transformed into a sequence of LPs due to the complicated
expression for the secrecy outage constraint, i.e., (15c). This
incurs more difficulties to solve the problem (15) compared
with many design problems of NOMA schemes without the
secrecy outage constraint.
C. Optimal Solution
The optimal solution to the problem (15) is summarized in
the following theorem, based on which we can first obtain the
optimal power allocated to user K , and then iteratively obtain
the optimal power allocated to the other users.
Theorem 1: When the problem (15) is feasible, the optimal
solution of P to the problem (15) is P o = [P o1 , · · · , P oK ],
where
P ok=


(2Q−1)(1+γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)
∑K
i=k+1P
o
i )(1+γk
∑K
i=k+1P
o
i )
γk(1−γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)(2Q−1)
∑
K
i=k+1P
o
i )−γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)2Q
, if k≤K−1
2Q−1
γK−γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)2Q
, if k = K.
(16)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary 1: The problem (15) is feasible if and only if
γk
(
1−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) (
2Q−1) K∑
i=k+1
P oi
)
−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q > 0,
∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K − 1} (17)
γK − γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q > 0, (18)
where P ok is given in (16).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 1: According to Corollary 1, we note that the
problem (15) is not always feasible. The problem (15) is
infeasible when the QoS constraint and/or the secrecy con-
straint cannot be satisfied even with an infinite transmit power,
i.e.,
∑K
k=1 Pk → ∞. We note that the feasibility of the
problem is determined by the channel condition, γk and γ¯e, the
QoS constraint, Q, and the secrecy constraint, ǫ. In practice,
when it is infeasible to serve all users under the QoS and
secrecy constraints, the transmitter may reduce the number
of users to be served using a certain user-selection policy. In
the following, we briefly discuss some possible user-selection
policies, while the detail of the user selection policy is beyond
the scope of this work.
From (17) and (18), we find that it is infeasible to serve
any user i whose channel condition is not sufficiently good
to ensure γi > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q. Hence, the transmitter first
excludes any user i with γi ≤ γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q. Then, the
transmitter selects users among all other users. Note that
the user-selection policy depends on application-specific re-
quirements. For example, to enhance the sum of confidential
information rates, the transmitter may select the user who
has the best channel condition, and iteratively adds the user
whose channel condition is the best among all remaining
users until (17) cannot be satisfied. On the other hand, under
fairness consideration, the transmitter may add users based
on, e.g., the proportional fairness criteria until (17) cannot
be satisfied. When there is no user k in the network with
γk > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q at the time slot, the transmitter would
suspend the transmission.
6pso,π(k) = P
(
Rot,π(k) −Q < log2
(
1 + SINRπ˜(k)
))
=


exp

− 1γ¯e

 1+γt,pi(k)
∑K
i=k
Ppi(i)
1+γt,pi(k)
∑K
i=k+1
Ppi(i)
−2Q
2Q
∑
K
i=k Ppi(i)−
1+γt,pi(k)
∑K
i=k
Ppi(i)
1+γt,pi(k)
∑K
i=k+1
Ppi(i)
∑
K
i=k+1 Ppi(i)



 , if k ≤ K − 1
exp
(
− 1γ¯e
(
1+γpi(K)Ppi(K)−2
Q
2QPpi(K)
))
, if k = K.
(12)
IV. FAIRNESS INFORMATION RATE MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we study the design problem of the NOMA
scheme that maximizes the minimum confidential information
rate among users subject to the secrecy constraint and an
instantaneous transmit power constraint. The objective of
maximizing the minimum confidential information rate among
users is motivated by the consideration of fairness among
users. We note that both design problems in this and the pre-
vious sections have taken the secrecy constraint into account.
The transmit power is considered in the objective function
and the confidential information rate (the QoS performance) is
considered in the constraints in Section III, while the transmit
power is considered in the constraints and the confidential
information rate is considered in the objective function in this
section. In fact, we will show later that the solution to the
design problem in this section is based on the design solution
given in Section III.
A. Problem Formulation
The problem is formulated as follows:
max
pi,P ,Rt,Rs
min
k∈{1,··· ,K}
Rs,π(k), (19a)
s.t. (9b), (9c), (9d), (9e), (9g), (19b)
K∑
k=1
Pπ(k) ≤ P, (19c)
where (9g) and (19c) represent the secrecy constraint and
the power constraint, respectively, and P > 0 denotes the
maximum available instantaneous transmit power.
Following the similar analysis in Section III, the optimal
solution of pi, Rt, and Rs, to the problem (19) are given by
π∗(k) = k, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (20)
R∗t,k =
{
log2
(
1 + γkPk
1+γk
∑
K
i=k+1 Pi
)
, if k ≤ K − 1
log2 (1 + γKPK) , if k = K,
(21)
R∗s,k = Rs,min, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} , (22)
respectively. The problem (19) is then simplified as:
max
P ,Rs,min
Rs,min, (23a)
s.t. (15b) and (19c), (23b)
0 < Rs,min, (23c)
(15c) with Q = Rs,min, (23d)
(15d) with Q = Rs,min. (23e)
Note that the constraint (23d) is still non-convex. The design
parameters P1, · · · , PK and Rs,min are coupled with each
other in a complicated way.
B. Optimal Solution
Proposition 2: The problem (23) is feasible if and only if
γk > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} . (24)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 2: According to Proposition 2, the problem (23)
is not always feasible. The problem (23) is infeasible when a
positive minimum confidential information rate, i.e., Rs,min >
0, is never achievable subject to the secrecy constraint. The
feasibility of the problem (23) is determined by the channel
condition, γk and γ¯e, and the secrecy constraint, ǫ. To ensure
that the transmission design is feasible, the transmitter can
adopt a simple user-selection policy to exclude any user i
whose channel condition is not sufficiently good such that
γi ≤ γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
. When there is no user k in the network
with γk > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
at the time slot, the transmitter would
suspend the transmission. In the rest of the analysis in this
section, we assume that (24) is satisfied.
In the following, we first describe the basic methodology
to solve the problem (23). Then, we present an iterative
algorithm to solve the problem. We further derive the closed-
form solution to the problem for the case of two users.
The methodology to solve the problem (23) is given as
follows. Denote the optimal Rs,min to the problem (23) as
R∗s,min. We can easily find that R
∗
s,min is unique. For a
constant value Q, if the following problem (25) is feasible,
then R∗s,min ≥ Q. Otherwise, R∗s,min < Q.
min
P
K∑
k=1
Pk, (25a)
s.t. (15b), (15c), (15d), and (19c). (25b)
The feasibility problem of (25) is hard to solve directly.
Instead, we transform the feasibility problem of (25) to the
problem (15) in Section III. The problem (25) is feasible if
and only if the problem (15) is feasible and the solution to
the problem (15) satisfies (19c), i.e.,
∑K
k=1 P
o
k ≤ P , where
P ok is given in (16). From the analysis in Section III, both
the feasibility problem of (15) and the problem (15) itself are
solvable. Thus, the feasibility problem of (25) is solvable.
For an arbitrary number of users, we can obtain the optimal
Rs,min and P with a bisection search as summarized in
Algorithm 1. We highlight that the complexity of Algorithm 1
is low. Because the error of a bisection search algorithm
7decreases exponentially as the number of iterations increases,
the required number of iterations to achieve an acceptable
error v is relatively small. In addition, the complexity of
each iteration in Algorithm 1 is low, since the associated
inner problem (feasibility problem) of each iteration has
the closed-form solution, i.e., (16). The detailed analysis on
the complexity of Algorithm 1 is given as follows. For a
given acceptable error v, the number of iterations of Al-
gorithm 1 is equal to
⌈
log2
(
QUB−QLB
v
)⌉
. We note that the
complexity of each iteration is dominated by the derivations
of (16). Based on the rules of counting floating point op-
erations (flops) [37], we obtain the complexity of (16) as
O
(
1.5K2 + 24.5K − 13) flops. Then, the total complexity
of the algorithm is equal to the product of the number of
iterations and the complexity of each iteration, which is given
by O
((
1.5K2 + 24.5K − 13) ⌈log2 (QUB−QLBv )⌉).
Algorithm 1 Optimal solution to the problem (23)
1: input Channel condition: γ1, · · · , γK and γe;
Transmit power constraint: P ;
Secrecy constraint: ǫ;
Acceptable error of R∗s,min: v (e.g., v = 10
−10);
2: output Optimal rate: R∗s,min;
Optimal power allocation parameters: P ∗ =
[P ∗1 , · · · , P ∗K ];
3: Initialize QLB = 0; QUB = log2 (1 + γ1P );
4: while QUB −QLB ≥ v do
5: Set Q =
(
QUB +QLB
)
/2;
6: Obtain P o = [P o1 , · · · , P oK ] according to (16);
7: if (17), (18), and
∑K
k=1 P
o
k ≤ P are all satisfied then
8: Set QLB = Q; {Update the upper bound of R∗s,min.}
9: Set R∗s,min = Q;
10: Set P ∗ = P o;
11: else
12: Set QUB = Q; {Update the upper bound of R∗s,min.}
13: end if
14: end while
15: return R∗s,min and P
∗; {The solution to the problem (23)
is obtained.}
In the case of two users, we obtain the closed-form expres-
sions for the solutions to the problem (23), which are summa-
rized in the following Proposition 3. It is worth mentioning
that the scenario of two users to perform NOMA jointly
is of practical interest. Since a NOMA system is strongly
interference-limited, having a large number of users to perform
NOMA jointly is usually not realistic. Especially, it is often
to group two users together to perform NOMA jointly in the
studies of NOMA schemes with the technique of user pairing,
e.g., [9].
Proposition 3: When the problem (23) is feasible, the op-
timal solutions of P and Rs,min to the problem (23) with
K = 2 are given by
P ∗1 =
(1 + φP ) (γ2 + γ1 (1 + 2γ2P )− 2φ (1 + γ1P ))− ψ
2 ((1 + φP ) γ1γ2 − φ2 (1 + γ1P )) ,
(26)
P ∗2 =
ψ − (γ1 + γ2)− φ (γ2P − γ1P − 2)
2 ((1 + φP ) γ1γ2 − φ2 (1 + γ1P )) , (27)
and
R∗s,min =
ψ − (1 + φP ) (γ2 − γ1)
2 (1 + φP ) (γ1 − φ) , (28)
respectively, where φ = γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
and
ψ=
√
(1+φP )
(
4 (1+γ1P ) (γ1−φ) (γ2−φ)+(1+φP ) (γ2−γ1)
2
)
.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Denote the optimal ratio of power allocated to user 1 as
β∗1 =
P ∗1
P
=
(1+φP ) (γ2+γ1 (1+2γ2P )−2φ (1+γ1P ))−ψ
2P ((1 + φP ) γ1γ2 − φ2 (1 + γ1P )) .
(29)
From Proposition 3, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2: The optimal ratio of power allocated to user 1,
β∗1 , is a monotonously increasing function of φ = γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
.
Proof: See Appendix F.
From Corollary 2, we find that ∂β∗1/∂γ¯e > 0 and ∂β
∗
1/∂ǫ <
0. Thus, it is wise to increase the ratio of power allocated to
the user whose channel condition is bad, i.e., user 1, when the
eavesdropper’s channel condition improves and/or the secrecy
constraint becomes more stringent.
V. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN NOMA AND
OMA
In this section, we analytically compare the performance of
the NOMA scheme and a benchmark OMA scheme. We focus
on the performance comparison in terms of the maximum
achievable minimum confidential information rate among
users subject to the secrecy outage constraint and the transmit
power constraint, i.e., the problem (19) in Section IV. The
performance comparison in terms of the minimum transmit
power required to satisfy the QoS constraint and the secrecy
constraint is similar, and hence, the details are omitted for the
sake of brevity.
A. Benchmark Scheme
We consider the TDMA scheme as a benchmark, which
is a typical OMA scheme. Note that we can also consider
the orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA)
as the benchmark OMA scheme. The bandwidth resources are
split between users for the OFDMA and the time resources are
split between users for the TDMA. In fact, the analyses of the
OFDMA and the TDMA as the benchmark are mathematically
equivalent in this paper [38], [39]. As per the mechanism of
the TDMA scheme, the transmission during each fading block
is divided into K sub-slots. The k-th sub-slot is used to serve
user k. With the fixed transmit power P , the received SNRs
at user k and the eavesdropper in the k-th sub-slot are given
by γkP and γeP , respectively. Denote the time ratio allocated
to user k as tk,
∑K
k=1 tk ≤ 1. The effective channel capacity
8for user k and the eavesdropper to decode the message sk are
given by
CTDMAk = tk log2 (1 + γkP ) (30)
and
CTDMAe,k = tk log2 (1 + γeP ) , (31)
respectively. It is easy to find that the optimal codeword
transmission rate for the message sk is equal to the user
capacity, i.e.,
RTDMAt,k = C
TDMA
k = tk log2 (1 + γkP ) . (32)
Subject to the secrecy outage constraint pso,k ≤ ǫ, the maxi-
mum confidential information rate for the message sk is then
limited by tk
[
log2 (1 + Pγk)− log2
(
1 + P γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
))]+
,
where [x]+ = max {x, 0}. Note that the condition of ensuring
a positive confidential information rate for all users is that
γk > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, which is the same as the
condition for the NOMA scheme as given in Proposition 2.
Thus, the achievable confidential information rate for user k
is given by
RTDMAs,k ≤ tk log2
(
1 + Pγk
1 + P γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)
)
, (33)
and the minimum confidential information rate among all users
is given by
RTDMAs,min = min
k∈{1,··· ,K}
RTDMAs,k . (34)
It is worth mentioning that most of the existing studies on
NOMA adopted the conventional TDMA scheme with equal
time sharing, i.e., t1 = · · · = tK , as the benchmark, e.g., [6],
[25], [31], [38]. In this section, we consider the TDMA scheme
with designable time allocation ratios as the benchmark, and
will consider the conventional TDMA scheme with equal
time sharing later in the numerical results in Section VI.
In fact, the conventional TDMA scheme with equal time
sharing is a special case of the TDMA scheme with designable
time allocation ratios, t1, · · · , tk. Therefore, if the NOMA
scheme outperforms the TDMA scheme with designable time
allocation ratios, then the NOMA scheme also outperforms the
conventional TDMA scheme with equal time sharing.
B. Comparison Result
We focus on the case of two users, which is of practical
interest as mentioned before. For the NOMA scheme, the
maximum achievable minimum confidential information rate
among users is R∗s,min given in (28). For the TDMA scheme,
we can obtain the optimal time allocation that maximizes
RTDMAs,min by solving for t1 and t2 in the equations R
TDMA
s,1 =
RTDMAs,2 and t1+ t2 = 1, and the maximum R
TDMA
s,min is given by
max
t1,t2
RTDMAs,min =
log2
(
1+γ1P
1+γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)P
)
log2
(
1+γ2P
1+γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)P
)
log2
(
(1+γ1P )(1+γ2P )
(1+γ¯e ln(ǫ−1)P )
2
) .
(35)
The comparison result between the NOMA scheme and the
TDMA scheme is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: When γ1 6= γ2, the NOMA scheme can
always achieve a higher maximum minimum confidential
information rate among users than that of the TDMA scheme,
i.e.,
R∗s,min > max
t1,t2
RTDMAs,min , if γ1 6= γ2. (36)
When γ1 = γ2, the NOMA scheme and the TDMA scheme
can achieve the same maximum minimum confidential infor-
mation rate among users, i.e.,
R∗s,min = maxt1,t2
RTDMAs,min , if γ1 = γ2. (37)
Proof: See Appendix G.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results for the de-
signed NOMA schemes with the secrecy outage constraint. We
evaluate the NOMA scheme under a given channel realization
in Figures 2, 3, and 4, and show the average performance of
the NOMA scheme over 50,000 randomly generated channel
realizations in Figures 5 and 6.
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Fig. 2: Minimum transmit power versus QoS requirement. The
parameters are γk = 23 + 2k dB, γ¯e = 20 dB, and ǫ = 0.1.
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Fig. 3: Maximum minimum confidential information rate among users
versus transmit power constraint. The parameters are γk = 23 +
2k dB, γ¯e = 20 dB, and ǫ = 0.1.
We first illustrate the advantage of the NOMA scheme
over the OMA scheme in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 depicts
the performance in minimizing the transmit power,
∑K
k=1 Pk,
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Fig. 4: Optimal ratio of power allocated to user 1 versus secrecy
outage constraint. The parameters are P = 20 dBm, γ1 = 24 dB,
and γ2 = 26 dB.
subject to the QoS constraint, Q, which is the problem studied
in Section III. Figure 3 shows the performance in maximiz-
ing the minimum confidential information rate among users,
mink∈{1,··· ,K}Rs,k, subject to the transmit power constraint,
P , which is the problem studied in Section IV. For both
figures, the secrecy outage constraint is fixed at ǫ = 0.1.
Following the existing studies on NOMA, e.g., [6], [25], [31],
[38], we adopt the conventional TDMA as the benchmark
OMA scheme. As shown in both figures, the NOMA scheme
always outperforms the TDMA scheme for different numbers
of users, K . As depicted in Figure 2, for both the NOMA
scheme and the TDMA scheme,
∑K
k=1 Pk increases as Q
increases, and the infeasible Q cannot be satisfied even with an
infinite transmit power, i.e.,
∑K
k=1 Pk → ∞. The feasible Q
for the NOMA scheme can be found according to Corollary 1.
We note that the designed NOMA scheme achieves a better
QoS for all users than that for the TDMA scheme. From
Figure 3, one can note that mink∈{1,··· ,K}Rs,k increases as P
increases, and mink∈{1,··· ,K}Rs,k approaches an upper bound
as P continues to increase. For the designed NOMA scheme,
this upper bound is actually equal to the maximum feasible Q
to the problem studied in Section III.
We then demonstrate the optimal power allocation strategy
subject to different secrecy outage constraints. We consider
the power allocation ratio among two users to maximize the
minimum confidential information rate among users subject to
a given transmit power constraint of P = 20 dBm. Figure 4
plots the optimal ratio of power allocated to user 1, β∗1 =
P ∗1 /P versus the secrecy outage constraint, ǫ. As shown in the
figure, β∗1 monotonously decreases as ǫ increases. Comparing
different curves, we find that β∗1 increases as γ¯e increases.
These observations are consistent with the analytical result
given in Corollary 2. Note that user 1 represents the user who
has a relatively bad channel. Thus, it is wise to reduce the
power allocated to the weak user, when the secrecy constraint
becomes loose, while it is wise to increase the power allocated
to the weak user, when the eavesdropper’s channel condition
improves.
We now present the tradeoff between the secrecy perfor-
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9100.511.522.533.5ǫ¯Rs,minK=2K=3K=4NOMATDMA
Fig. 5: Average maximum minimum confidential information rate
among users versus transmit power constraint. The parameters are
P = 20 dBm, α = 4, dk = 50, de = 80, and σ
2
u = σ
2
e = −70 dBm.
mance and the QoS performance of the NOMA scheme.
Figure 5 plots the average minimum confidential information
rate among users over different randomly generated channel
realizations, which is denoted by R¯s,min = E {mink Rs,k},
versus the secrecy outage constraint, ǫ. The transmit power
constraint is fixed at P = 20 dBm. As shown in the figure,
for both the NOMA scheme and the TDMA scheme, there is
a clear tradeoff between the QoS performance and the secrecy
performance. A better QoS performance can be obtained at
a cost of secrecy performance, and vice versa, since R¯s,min
increases as ǫ increases. Comparing the NOMA scheme and
the TDMA scheme, we note that the NOMA scheme always
achieves a better QoS-secrecy tradeoff than that of the TDMA
scheme regardless of how many users to be served.
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Fig. 6: Performance gain of NOMA over TDMA versus number of
users. The parameters are ǫ = 0.1, α = 4, de = 80, and σ
2
u = σ
2
e =
−70 dBm.
Finally, we show the performance gain of our proposed
NOMA scheme over the benchmark OMA scheme. Figure
6 plots R¯NOMAmin /R¯
TDMA
min versus the number of users, K ,
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where R¯NOMAmin and R¯
TDMA
min denote the average maximum
minimum confidential information rates among users achieved
by the NOMA scheme and the TDMA scheme, respectively.
Figure 6(a) demonstrates the results for the scenario where
the users have better channel statistics than the eavesdropper
(dk < de). Figure 6(b) demonstrates the results for the
scenario where the users have the same channel statistics as
the eavesdropper (dk = de). As illustrated in both figures,
the value of R¯NOMAmin /R¯
TDMA
min is always larger than 1, which
indicates that our proposed NOMA scheme always has the
advantage over the TDMA scheme. Comparing Figures 6(a)
and 6(b), we find that having the same channel statistics
between the users and the eavesdropper does not affect the
performance gain achieved by the NOMA scheme over the
TDMA scheme. As shown in both figures, R¯NOMAmin /R¯
TDMA
min
increases almost linearly as K increases, which indicates that
the performance gain becomes more significant as the number
of users increases.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the optimal design of se-
cure NOMA schemes. We have first designed the NOMA
scheme that minimizes the transmit power subject to the
secrecy outage and QoS constraints. We have then designed
the NOMA scheme that maximizes the minimum confidential
information rate subject to the secrecy outage and transmit
power constraints. The optimal solutions show that the optimal
decoding order for NOMA does not change by having the
secrecy outage constraint in the studied problems and one
should increase the ratio of power allocated to the weak
user when the secrecy constraint becomes more stringent.
Numerical results have demonstrated that the NOMA scheme
outperforms the OMA scheme regardless of how many users
to be served. One interesting future research direction is to
introduce the MIMO technique to secure NOMA systems. In
addition, this work has focused on the secrecy issue against
the external eavesdropper in NOMA systems. The secrecy
issue among users in fact is more challenging to address in
NOMA systems, since most users need to decode other users’
signals before decoding their own signals for the SIC. Thus,
how to ensure the secrecy among users in NOMA systems
is another interesting future research direction. Furthermore,
how to enhance the secrecy performance of the code domain
NOMA is an important problem to address, while our work
has considered the power domain NOMA only.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider any given power allocation vector P =[
Pπ(k), · · · , Pπ(K)
]
. Assume that there is an arbitrary de-
coding order with user π(x) = m and user π(x + 1) = n,
where γm > γn. If we switch the decoding order of these
two users such that π(x) = n and π(x + 1) = n, we find
that any γt,π(k) = mini∈{k,··· ,K} γπ(i), k 6= x + 1, will not
change, while γt,π(x+1) will increase or remain unchanged.
From (12), we find that pso,π(k) decreases as γt,π(k) increases.
Thus, switching these two users does not change the secrecy
outage probability for any message sπ(k), k 6= m + 1, while
may decrease the secrecy outage probability for the message
sπ(m+1).
The discussion above shows that, subject to any given power
allocation, switching the decoding order of these two users
does not worse the performance of the NOMA scheme but
may improve the performance. Hence, it is wise to iteratively
switch the decoding order of any two users π(x) and π(x+1)
with γπ(x) > γπ(x+1) until we get the optimal decoding order,
which satisfies (13). Note that γ1 ≤ · · · ≤ γK . Then, pio given
in Proposition 1 is the optimal decoding order to the problem.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Rewrite (15c) as γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤ fk (x, y), ∀k ∈
{1, · · · ,K − 1}, where x = Pk, y =
∑K
i=k+1 Pi, and
fk (x, y) =
1+γk(x+y)
1+γky
− 2Q
2Q(x+ y)− 1+γk(x+y)1+γky y
. (38)
Taking the partial derivative of fk (x, y) with respect to x, we
have
∂fk (x, y)
∂x
=
(
2Q − 1) 2Q (1 + γky)2
(2Q (x+y) (1+γky)−y (1+γk (x+y)))2
> 0.
(39)
Taking the partial derivative of fk (x, y) with respect to y, we
have
∂fk (x, y)
∂y
=
(
2Q − 1) (2Q (1 + γky)2 − (1 + γk (x+ y))2)
(y − (x+ y) (s+ γk (2Q − 1) y))2
.
(40)
We note that sgn
{
∂fk(x,y)
∂y
}
=
sgn
{
2Q (1 + γky)
2 − (1 + γk (x+ y))2
}
. From the
constraint
Q ≤ Rt,k=log2
(
1+
γkPk
1+γk
∑K
i=k+1Pi
)
, ∀k∈{1,· · · ,K−1} ,
(41)
we have x ≥ (2
Q−1)(1+γky)
γk
. Since 2Q (1 + γky)
2 −
(1 + γk (x+ y))
2
increases as x decreases, we find that
2Q (1 + γky)
2 − (1 + γk (x+ y))2
≤2Q (1 + γky)2 −
(
1 + γk
((
2Q − 1) (1 + γky)
γk
+ y
))2
=− (2Q − 1) 2Q (1 + γky)2 < 0. (42)
Therefore, we have ∂fk (x, y) /∂x > 0 and ∂fk (x, y) /∂y <
0, which indicates: 1) for any given
∑K
i=k+1 Pi, the minimum
Pk is obtained when the constraint (15c) is active, and 2) the
minimum Pk decreases as
∑K
i=k+1 Pi decreases. We further
find that the minimum PK is obtained when the constraint
(15d) is active. Then, the optimal P can be iteratively obtained
as given in Theorem 1. This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
It is easy to prove that the problem (15) is feasible if (17)
and (18) can be satisfied, since P o = [P o1 , · · · , P oK ] would
be a solution of P to the problem (15) when (17) and (18)
can be satisfied. In the following, we prove that the problem
(15) is infeasible when (17) and/or (18) cannot be satisfied. To
this end, we show that (15c) and/or (15d) cannot be satisfied
subject to (15b), when (17) and/or (18) cannot be satisfied.
We rewrite (15d) as
2Q − 1 ≤ (γK − γ¯e ln (ǫ−1) 2Q)PK , (43)
and find that (43) is not achievable for any PK > 0 when
(18) is not satisfied. Thus, (15d) cannot be satisfied subject to
(15b), when (18) is not satisfied.
Now, we consider the situation where
γm
(
1−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) (
2Q−1) K∑
i=m+1
P oi
)
−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q ≤ 0
(44)
and
γn
(
1−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) (
2Q−1) K∑
i=n+1
P oi
)
−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q > 0,
∀n ∈ {m+ 1, · · · ,K} . (45)
According to the discussion in Appendix B, we know that
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤
1+γm
∑K
i=m Pi
1+γm
∑
K
i=m+1 Pi
− 2Q
2Q
∑K
i=m Pi − 1+γm
∑
K
i=m Pi
1+γm
∑
K
i=m+1 Pi
∑K
i=m+1 Pi
(46)
always cannot be satisfied if
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤
1 + γmPm
1+γm
∑
K
i=m+1 P
o
i
− 2Q
2Q
(
Pm+
∑K
i=m+1P
o
i
)
−
(
1+ γmPm
1+γm
∑
K
i=m+1P
o
i
)∑K
i=m+1P
o
i
(47)
is not satisfied. We can rewrite (47) as
(
2Q−1)
(
1+γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) K∑
i=m+1
P oi
)(
1+γm
K∑
i=m+1
P oi
)
≤
(
γm
(
1−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) (
2Q−1) K∑
i=m+1
P oi
)
−γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
2Q
)
Pm.
(48)
We find that (48) is not achievable for any Pm > 0 when (44)
and (45) happen. Therefore, (15c) cannot be satisfied subject
to (15b), when (17) cannot be satisfied. This completes the
proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We can find that the problem (23) is infeasible if any of
the constraints in the problem cannot be satisfied even with
Rs,min → 0. We can also find that the problem (23) is feasible
if all constraints in the problem can be satisfied with Rs,min →
0. When Rs,min → 0, the constraints (23d) and (23e) become
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤
1+γk
∑K
i=k Pi
1+γk
∑
K
i=k+1 Pi
− 1∑K
i=k Pi − 1+γk
∑
K
i=k Pi
1+γk
∑
K
i=k+1 Pi
∑K
i=k+1 Pi
= γk,
∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K − 1} (49)
and
γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
) ≤ γK , (50)
respectively. Thus, when γk > γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K},
the constraints can be satisfied by having a sufficiently small
Rs,min. Otherwise, (23d) and/or (23e) cannot be satisfied even
if Rs,min → 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In the proof, we first obtain the optimal Rs,min, and then
get the optimal P1 and P2 accordingly.
The optimal Rs,min, i.e., R
∗
s,min, is the maximum Q subject
to which the problem (15) is feasible and the solution to
the problem (15) satisfies
∑K
k=1 P
o
k ≤ P . According to
Corollary 1, the problem (15) is feasible when both (17) and
(18) can be satisfied. Denote φ = γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
. From (17) and
(18) with K = 2, we have
2Q <
γ2
φ
= b1 (51)
and
2Q<
φ−
1
2
(
4φ2γ1−3φγ21−6φγ1γ2+4γ21γ2+φγ22
)1
2−(γ2−γ1)
2 (γ1−φ) =b2.
(52)
Based on Theorem 1, the solutions of P1 and P2 to the problem
(15) subject to a given Q are given by
P o1 =
(
2Q − 1) (1 + γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)P o2 ) (1 + γkP o2 )
γk (1− γ¯e ln (ǫ−1) (2Q − 1)P o2 )− γ¯e ln (ǫ−1) 2Q
=
(γ2 − φ)
(
2Q − 1) (γ2 − γ1 + 2Q (γ1 − φ))
(2Qφ−γ2) (φ (γ22Q+γ1(4Q−2Q+1))−φ24Q −γ1γ2)
(53)
and
P o2 =
2Q − 1
γ2 − γ¯e ln (ǫ−1) 2Q , (54)
respectively. Substituting (53) and (54) into the constraint P o1+
P o2 ≤ P , we have
2Q ≤ ψ − (1 + φP ) (γ2 − γ1)
2 (1 + φP ) (γ1 − φ) = b3, (55)
where
ψ=
√
(1+φP )
(
4 (1+γ1P )(γ1−φ) (γ2−φ)+(1+φP )(γ2−γ1)
2
)
.
After performing a series of algebraic manipulations, we find
that
sgn {b1 − b3} =
sgn
{
4(1+φP )(γ1−φ)(γ2−φ)
((
γ1γ2−φ2
)
+γ1φP (γ2−φ)
)}
(56)
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and
sgn {b2 − b3} = sgn
{
4 (1 + φP ) (γ1 − φ)3 (γ2 − φ)
}
.
(57)
Since γ2 > γ1 > φ and P > 0, we have b1 − b3 > 0
and b2 − b3 > 0, which indicates that min {b1, b2, b3} = b3.
Thus, the constraint (55) is always the most stringent among
the constraints (51), (52), and (55). Then, R∗s,min in (28) is
obtained by solving for Q in the equation 2Q = b3.
Accordingly, P ∗1 in (26) and P
∗
2 in (27) are derived by
substituting Q = R∗s,min into (53) and (54), respectively. This
completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
We find that it is difficult to directly analyze the derivative
of β∗1 with respect to φ due to the complicated expression for
∂β∗1/∂φ. Thus, we rewrite β1 in (29) as
β∗1=
ρ1+ρ2+2ρ1ρ2−2ϕ2(1+ρ1)+ϕ (ρ2−ρ1+2ρ1ρ2−2)−ω
2 ((1 + ϕ) ρ1ρ2 − ϕ2 (1 + ρ1)) ,
(58)
where ρ1 = γ1P , ρ2 = γ2P , ϕ = φP , and
ω =
√
(1+ϕ)
(
4 (1+ρ1) (ρ1−ϕ) (ρ2 − ϕ) + (1 + ϕ) (ρ2 − ρ1)
2
)
.
For any given P > 0, taking the derivative of β∗1 with respect
to ϕ, we have
∂β∗1
∂ϕ
=
4(1+ϕ)(ρ1−ϕ)(ρ2−ϕ)(1+ρ1)
(
2ϕ+ϕ2−ρ1−ρ2−ρ1ρ2+ω
)
ω ((1 + ϕ) (ϕ (ρ1 + ρ2)− 2ρ1ρ2) + ϕω)2
.
(59)
After performing a series of algebraic manipulations, we find
that
sgn
{
∂β∗1
∂ϕ
}
= sgn
{
ϕ2 − 2ϕρ1 + ρ1ρ2 + (2 + ϕ) (ρ2 − ρ1)
}
.
(60)
Note that ρ2 ≥ ρ1 > ϕ, since P > 0 and γ2 ≥ γ1 > φ. When
ρ2 ≥ ρ1 > ϕ, we find that
ϕ2 − 2ϕρ1 + ρ1ρ2 + (2 + ϕ) (ρ2 − ρ1) >
(ρ1 − ϕ)2 + (2 + ϕ) (ρ2 − ρ1) > 0. (61)
Thus, ∂β∗1/∂φ > 0. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Denote the achievable confidential information rate pairs of
user 1 and user 2 by the TDMA scheme and NOMA scheme
as
(
RTDMAs,1 , R
TDMA
s,2
)
and
(
RNOMAs,1 , R
NOMA
s,2
)
, respectively. We
know that the boundary of rate pairs is obtained when the
available resources are all used, i.e., t1+t2 = 1 for the TDMA
scheme and P1+P2 = P for the NOMA scheme. Thus, based
on (33), the upper boundary of the rate pairs achieved by the
TDMA scheme is given by(
RTDMAs,1,up = (1− t2) log2
(
1 + γ1P
1 + γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)P
)
,
RTDMAs,2,up = t2 log2
(
1 + γ2P
1 + γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)P
))
. (62)
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Fig. 7: An illustration of the boundary of confidential information
rate pairs with γ1 6= γ2.
From (23d) and (23e), the upper boundary of the rate pairs
achieved by the NOMA scheme is given by(
RNOMAs,1,up = log2
(
(1 + γ1P )
(
1 + γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
P2
)
(1 + γ1P2) (1 + γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)P )
)
,
RNOMAs,2,up = log2
(
1 + γ2P2
1 + γ¯e ln (ǫ−1)P2
))
. (63)
From (62) and (63), we find that(
RTDMAs,1,up (t2=0) , R
TDMA
s,2,up (t2 = 0)
)
=
(
RNOMAs,1,up (P2 = 0) , R
NOMA
s,2,up (P2 = 0)
)
(64)
and (
RTDMAs,1,up (t2 = 1) , R
TDMA
s,2,up (t2 = 1)
)
=
(
RNOMAs,1,up (P2 = P ) , R
NOMA
s,2,up (P2 = P )
)
. (65)
We also find that the rate pairs achieved by the TDMA scheme
are in a convex region with the affine boundary. Thus, we can
prove that any rate pair achieved by the TDMA is strictly
smaller than a rate pair that can be achieved by the NOMA
scheme if the upper boundary of the rate pairs achieved by
the NOMA scheme is a concave function. We can also prove
that any rate pair achieved by the TDMA is the same to a rate
pair achieved by the NOMA scheme if the upper boundary
of the rate pairs achieved by the NOMA scheme is a affine
function. An illustration of the boundary of rate pair is given
in Figure 7.
In the following, we investigate the upper boundary
of the rate paired achieved by the NOMA scheme, i.e.,(
RNOMAs,1,up , R
NOMA
s,2,up
)
. From (63), we can rewrite RNOMAs,1,up as a
function of RNOMAs,2,up , which is given by
RNOMAs,1,up = log2

 (1 + ρ1) (ρ2 − ϕ)
(1 + ϕ)
(
ρ2 − ρ1 + (ρ1 − ϕ) 2RNOMAs,2,up
)

 .
(66)
where ρ1 = γ1P , ρ2 = γ2P , and ϕ = γ¯e ln
(
ǫ−1
)
P . Taking
the second order derivative of RNOMAs,1,up with respect to R
NOMA
s,2,up ,
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we have
∂2RNOMAs,1,up
∂
(
RNOMAs,2,up
)2 = −2R
NOMA
s,2,up (ln(2))
2
(ρ2 − ρ1) (ρ1 − ϕ)(
ρ2 − ρ1 + (ρ1 − ϕ) 2RNOMAs,2,up
)2 . (67)
From (67), we see that ∂2RNOMAs,1,up /∂
(
RNOMAs,2,up
)2
< 0 if ρ1 <
ρ2, i.e., γ1 < γ2. Thus, the upper boundary of the rate pairs
achieved by the NOMA scheme is a concave function when
γ1 6= γ2. When ρ1 = ρ2, i.e., γ1 = γ2, we have
RNOMAs,1,up = log2
(
1 + ρ1
1 + ϕ
)
−RNOMAs,2,up . (68)
Thus, the upper boundary of the rate pairs achieved by the
NOMA scheme is an affine function when γ1 = γ2. This
completes the proof.
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